Uzi Segal

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Office

Dept. of Economics, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467. Tel. (617) 552-1567.

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Degrees

Publications in refereed journals

1. Large compound lotteries (with Z. Safra). *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, forthcoming.

2. Social influence in committee deliberation (with C. Fershtman). *Theory & Decision*, 96 (2024), 185{207.

3. *8* or *9*? *Theoretical Economics*, 18 (2023), 1{13.

4. All probabilities are equal, but some probabilities are more equal than others (with C. Letsou and S. Naeh). *Economic Theory*, 74 (2022), 423{445.

5. A lot of ambiguity (with Z. Safra). *Journal of Economic Theory*, 200 (2022), p. 105393.

6. Intransitivity in the small and in the large (with S. Bikhchandani). *Journal of Risk & Uncertainty*, 63 (2021), 257{273.

7. Allocation mechanisms without reduction (with D. Dillenberger). *American Economic Review: Insights*, 3 (2021), 455{69.

8. Calibration results for incomplete preferences (with Z. Safra), *Revue Economique*, 71 (2020), 323{330.

9. Preferences and social influence (with C. Fershtman), *American*

14. Who benefits from the uniformity of contingent fee rates? (with E. Zamir and B. Medina). *Review of Law & Economics*, 9 (2013), 357–387.

15. Ranking ranking rules (with B. Medina and S. Naeh). *Review of Law & Economics*, 9 (2013), 73–96.

16. On the likelihood of cyclic comparisons (with A. Rubinstein). *Journal of Economic Theory*, 147 (2012), 2483–2491.

17. No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods (with J. Ostroy). *Social Choice & Welfare*, 39 (2012), 697–719.

18. Transitive regret (with Sushil Bikhchandani). *Theoretical Economics*, 6 (2011), 95–108.

19. Risk aversion in the small and in the large: Calibration results for betweenness functionals (with Zvi Safra). *Journal of Risk & Uncertainty*, 38:1 (2009), 27–37.

20. Calibration results for non-expected utility theories (with Zvi Safra). *Econometrica*, 76:5 (2008), 1143–1166.

21. A Characterization of Intrinsic Reciprocity (with Joel Sobel). *International Journal of Game Theory*, 36:3–4 (2008), 571–585.

22. Unanimous subjective probabilities (with Kim Border and Paolo Ghirardato), *Economic Theory*, 34:2 (2008), 383–387.

23. The ambiguous nature of ambiguity and crime control (with Anat Horovitz). *NYU Journal of Law and Liberty* (2007), 542–557.

24. Tit for tat: Foundations of preferences for reciprocity in strategic settings (with Joel Sobel), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 136:1 (2007), 197–216.

25. Ambiguity aversion and the criminal process (with Alex Stein), *Notre Dame Law Review*, 81:4 (2006), 1495–1551.

26. Fair bias, *Economics and Philosophy*, 22 (2006), 213–229.

27. Democratically elected aristocracies (with David Heyd), *Social Choice & Welfare*, 27 (2006), 103{127.

28. Ex-post egalitarianism and legal justice (with Alon Harel and Zvi Safra), *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 21 (2005), 57{75.

29. Super majoritarianism and the endowment e ect (with Uriel Procaccia), *Theory & Decision*, 55 (2004), 181{207.

30. Min, max, and sum (with Joel Sobel), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 106 (2002), 126{150.

31. Coherent odds and subjective probability (with Kim C. Border), *Journal of Mathematical Psychology*, 46 (2002), 253{268.

32. On the Economic meaning of Machina's Frechet di erentiability assumption (with Zvi Safra), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 104 (2002), 450{461.

33. Rank dependent preferences without ranking axioms (with Zvi Safra), *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 35 (2001), 547{562.

34. Let's agree that all dictatorships are equally bad, *Journal of Political Economy*, 108 (2000), 569{589.

35. Don't fool yourself to believe you won't fool yourself again *Economics Letters*, 67 (2000), 1{3.

36. Criminal law and behavioral law and economics: Observations on the neglected role of uncertainty in deterring crime (with Alon Harel), *American Law and Economics Review*, 1 (2000), 276{312.

37. E cient incentive compatible economies are perfectly competitive (with Louis Makowski and Joseph M. Ostroy), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 85 (1999), 169{225.

38. Constant risk aversion (with Zvi Safra), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 83 (1998), 19{42.

39. Punishment schedules for capital ight (with D. Vincent), *The World Economy*, 21 (1998) 629{638.

40. Preferences over solutions to the bargaining problems (with Kim C. Border), *Econometrica*, 65 (1997), 1{18.

41. Dynamic consistency and reference points, *Journal of Economic Theory*, 72 (1997) 208{219.

42. First-order risk aversion and non-di erentiability (with A. Spivak), *Economic Theory*, 9 (1997), 179{183.

43. How complicated are betweenness preferences? (with Z. Safra), *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 24 (1995), 371{381.

44. Observing orders of risk aversion (with G. Loomes), *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, 9 (1994), 239{256.

45. Dynamic consistency implies approximately expected utility (with K. Border), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 63 (1994), 170{188.

46. A su cient condition for additively separable functions, *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 23 (1994), 295{303.

47. The projective independence axiom (with Chew S.H. and L.G. Epstein), *Economic Theory*, 4 (1994), 189{215.

48. Stochastic transitivity and quadratic representation functions, *Journal of Mathematical Psychology*, 38 (1994), 102{114.

49. Dutch book arguments and subjective probability (with K. Border), *Economic Journal*, 104 (1994), 71{75.

50. Order indi erence and rank-dependent probabilities, *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 22 (1993), 373{397.

51. The measure representation: A correction, *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, 6 (1993), 99{107.

52. The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism and generalized utility theories: Theoretical predictions and empirical observations (with L.R. Keller and T. Wang), *Theory & Decision*, 34 (1993), 83{97.

53. Dominance axioms and multivariate nonexpected utility preferences (with Z. Safra), *International Economic Review* 34 (1993), 321{334.

54. Stochastic dominance under Bayesian learning (with S. Bikhchandani and S. Sharma), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 56 (1992), 352{377.

55. Quadratic social welfare functions (with L.G. Epstein), *Journal of Political Economy*, 100 (1992), 691{712. Reprinted in J. Wood (ed.): *Amartya Sen: Critical Assessments of Contemporary Economists*, Routledge (2006).

66. Precautionary saving and risk aversion: An anticipated utility approach (with A. Spivak and J. Zeira), *Economics Letters*, 27 (1988), 223{227.

67. Non-expected utility risk premiums: The cases of probability ambiguity and outcome uncertainty (with A. Spivak), *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, (1988) 1, 333{347.

68. Does the preference reversal phenomenon necessarily contradict the independence axiom? *American Economic Review*

4. Dynamic consistency and non-expected utility, in L. Luini (ed.): *Uncertain Decisions*, 39{52. Boston: Kluwer AP, 1999.

5. The independence axiom versus the reduction axiom: Must we have both? In W. Edwards (ed.): *Utility Theories: Measurement and Applications*, 165{183. Boston: Kluwer AP, 1992.

Books

1. Mathematics for Economists 1 (with A. Rubinstein). Jerusalem: Academon, 1981 (In Hebrew).

2. Mathematics for Economists. Tel Aviv: Everyman University. 1993 (in Hebrew).

Editorial Boards

- Econometrica (Associate Editor 1995{2010)

- Journal of Economic Theory (Associate Editor 2012{2014)

- Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (Advisory Editor 1991{94, Associate Editor 1994{)

- Theoretical Economics (Associate Editor 2005{)

- Economics Letters (Associate Editor 2018{2023)

- Senior program committee, 18th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

- Program committee, Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, 2009

Other

- Fellow of the Econometric Society (2012)

- Economic Theory Fellow (2011)

Research Grants

- Connaught Fund #3-370-156-90, 1987 (two years).

- SSHRC #410-87-1375, 1987 (one year).

- SSHRC #410-88-0558, 1988 (two years).

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